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Abstract: Near the end of the 2009 Term the Supreme Court decided Morrison v. Australia
National  Bank,  Ltd.,  the  strongest  anti-extraterritoriality  opinion it  has  produced in  modern
times. Not only is Congress presumed generally to prefer only territorial regulation, but lower
courts that had carved out exceptions from this principle over a long period of time must now
revisit their positions. Again this year in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Co. the Court relied on an
aggressive use of the presumption against extraterritoriality to cut back on an important field of
private litigation. The Court appears to have embraced two related stances: The imposition of
barriers to extraterritorial regulation generally advances welfare, and the lower courts cannot
be trusted to determine those instances where an exception to this rule might be justified.
Implicit in the Court's position are intuitions about the political economy of both legislation and
litigation. I  want to use the occasion of  the Morrison and Kiobel  decisions to consider  the
political economy of extraterritorial regulation by the United States. International lawyers for
the  most  part  have  analyzed  state  decisions  to  exercise  prescriptive  jurisdiction  over
extraterritorial transactions in terms of a welfare calculus that determines the likely costs and
benefits to the state as a whole. Fewer studies have considered the political economy of the
decision whether to regulate foreign transactions. No work of which I am aware has considered
the political  economy of  deciding the extraterritorial  question through litigation.  This paper
seeks  to  fill  these  gaps  by  sketching  out  what  political  economy  suggests  both  about
extraterritoriality and the role of courts as arbiters of extraterritoriality.
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1. Introduction
One sign of the United States' arrival as an interna-
tional  hegemon was  the  imposition  of  its  economic
regulation on foreign actors and transactions. Break-
ing  with  a  tradition  that  had  limited  regulatory
authority (prescriptive jurisdiction) to a state's territ-
ory  and  subjects,  the  United  States  at  the  end  of
World War II claimed the right as well as the capacity
to regulate any transaction in which it had an interest
[1].  Australia,  Canada  and  the  European  powers
pushed back,  but  failed  to reverse this  stance.  Dy-
namic tension ensued. In 1988 the European Court of
Justice accepted that EC competition rules could apply
to overseas conduct [2]. Extraterritoriality of regulation
has become a fact of life, albeit a controversial one.
The stakes are considerable. On the one hand, a
state  that  fails  to  regulate  offshore  production  of
goods  and  services  might  allow  its  consumers  to
suffer (what it considers) injuries and its producers to
lose  international  market  share  to  under-regulated
competitors. On the other hand, a state might impose
offshore regulation to deprive foreign producers of an
otherwise  legitimate  competitive  advantage.  They
even can use regulation as a form of trade protection
by imposing stricter standards on foreign firms than
on domestic producers. There is every reason to think
that national interest  rather than global  welfare will
dominate what choices states make (see [3]).
Determining whether extraterritorial regulatory au-
thority exists involves a complex dynamic among the
three branches of government. The legislature must
create regulatory authority, in the course of which it
may or may not address the extraterritoriality issue.
The executive, as either the exclusive regulator or in
partnership  with  private  litigants,  may  make  asser-
tions about the scope of authority. Courts will adjudic-
ate claims made by both the executive and private
actors. The pronouncement of courts in turn will inform
the legislature about the kinds of signals it must send
to permit extraterritorial regulation.
In  1991,  the  Supreme Court  in  EEOC v.  Arabian
American Oil Co. (Aramco) sought to clarify the law [4].
The decision articulated a presumption against extra-
territoriality, making it more costly for Congress to au-
thorize such regulation. In 2011, the Court,  in  Mor-
rison v. Australia National Bank, Ltd., issued an even
stronger  anti-extraterritoriality  opinion  [5].  Not  only
was Congress presumed generally to prefer only ter-
ritorial  regulation,  but  lower  courts that  had carved
out exceptions from this principle over a long period
of time had to revisit their positions. Most recently, the
Court in  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell  invoked the pre-
sumption in a context that some (including four mem-
bers of the Court) think inapposite, namely the applica-
tion of international human rights law [6]. The last case
repudiated a wide swathe of circuit court decisions [7].
Three  data  points  may  not  support  much  social
science, but lawyers and policy makers must cope as
best they can. The Court appears to have embraced
two related stances: The imposition of barriers to ex-
traterritorial  regulation  generally  advances  welfare,
and the lower courts cannot be trusted to determine
those instances where an exception to this rule might
be justified. Implicit in the Court's position are intu-
itions about the political economy of both legislation
and litigation.
I  want  to  use  the  occasion  of  the  Morrison and
Kiobel decisions to consider the interests that produce
extraterritorial regulation by the United States. Inter-
national  lawyers  and international  relations  scholars
for  the  most  part  have  analyzed  state  decisions  to
exercise  prescriptive  jurisdiction  over  extraterritorial
transactions in terms of  a welfare calculus that de-
termines the likely costs and benefits to the state as a
whole (e.g., [8,9]). Fewer studies have considered the
political economy of the decision whether to regulate
foreign  transactions  [10].  No  work  of  which  I  am
aware has considered the political economy of decid-
ing the extraterritorial question through litigation [11].
This paper seeks to fill these gaps by sketching out
what political economy suggests both about extrater-
ritoriality and the role of courts as arbiters of regulat-
ory scope.
2. The Political Economy of Extraterritorial 
Regulation
The conventional international political economy story
starts with a strong assumption about states as in-
ternally  homogenous  actors.  This  "black  box"  ap-
proach posits national interests that states pursue in
interactions with other states. Within this framework,
states have incentives to pursue two general policies:
to export their own negative externalities and to resist
the importation of other states' negative externalities.
Antitrust provides convenient examples: A state may
encourage export cartels by its producers even as it
punishes  anticompetitive  conduct  by  external  actors
that affect its  economy. Confronted with these con-
flicting interests, a state has to pick a rule that max-
imizes the sum of protection for its export activities
and authorization of its capacity to regulate unwanted
imports. A country that only exports would opt for a
strong rule against extraterritorial regulation. A state
that  imports  goods  that  are  likely  to  be  cartelized
might want the authority to regulate offshore produ-
cers (see [9], supra note 6).
A  more  sophisticated  political-economy  analysis
would disaggregate the state to identify the discrete
interests of institutional actors within the state sector.
It would go beyond estimating overall national welfare
to assess the interests of particular influential groups
in the outcome of regulatory choices. A conventional
model of U.S. political economy, for example, depicts
the Executive as relatively more sensitive to foreign
influences, including those of foreign producers rep-
resented by their states. The Executive is in an iterative
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game with foreign governments that opens the pos-
sibility  for  solving  collective  action problems.  Senior
policymakers  within  the  Executive  also  are  mostly
political appointees that serve for relatively brief peri-
ods and thus are subject to revolving-door pressures.
Foreign economic interests are likely to be in the mix
of subsequent bidders for their services [12-14].
The Congress is more sensitive to domestic produ-
cers due to well recognized public choice effects. Pro-
ducers tend to be local, concentrated, and homogen-
ous in their interests, leading to natural alliances with
their representatives in Congress. Consumers are dis-
persed and heterogeneous in  their  interests,  raising
organizational costs and impeding their ability to wield
political  influence.  Moreover,  members  of  Congress
represent  local  rather  than  national  constituencies,
rendering  these  legislators  less  sensitive  to  general
national interests. Legislators face no penalty at the
polls  when  they  pander  to  local  hostility  to  foreign
interests,  and  receive no  reward when they  pursue
balanced  policies  that  incorporate  the  interests  of
foreigners.  In  addition,  because  Congress  does  not
have a permanent bureaucracy, or at least has much
less of one than does the Executive, its capacity to
participate in iterative interactions with foreign states
is  more  limited.  Finally,  the  leadership  of  Congress
and their staff turn over less frequently than do senior
Executive officials,  diluting the revolving door effect
compared to their Executive-branch counterparts. The
net effect should be a body sensitive to the concerns
of domestic producers, insensitive to the concerns of
domestic  consumers,  and  largely  indifferent  to  the
welfare of foreign producers and consumers.
Applying this simple, indeed rudimentary, model to
decisions about extraterritorial regulation, one would
predict that Congress would push both for immunity
for domestic producers from foreign regulation and for
extraterritorial application of U.S. regulation. The ar-
gument for the immunity is easy. Domestic producers
would argue that foreign regulation is discriminatory
and harmful to U.S. interests. The argument for extra-
territorial extensions of U.S. regulation would rest on
the assertion  that  foreign  producer  behavior  under-
cuts  U.S.  producers  both  at  home and abroad and
also endangers U.S. consumers. Congress would have
no particular reason to act consistently, as foreign in-
terests do not participate in their elections. Moreover,
because it lacks foreign interlocutors to challenge its
choices,  it  would not focus on the indirect  costs  of
such inconsistency, such as foreign retaliation against
U.S. exporters.
The model predicts that the Executive would push
back against these proposals. The ability of local pro-
ducers to capture strong advocates in Congress does
not translate into the same pressures on the Execut-
ive. The Executive should focus most on groups with
effective  power  in  marginal,  large-electoral  vote
states. Moreover, the Executive must engage with for-
eign governments, and components of the Executive,
not least the President himself, will be judged based
on  outcomes  over  which  foreign  governments  have
some influence. Finally, the Executive has a substan-
tial permanent bureaucracy that interacts with foreign
governments  and  wishes  their  exchanges  to  go
smoothly. The bureaucrats, as well as senior Executive
officials,  might  enjoy  subsequent  careers  in  the
private sector working on behalf of foreign interests.
For all these reasons, the Executive will be more sens-
itive to concerns about consistency than will Congress.
It,  rather  than  Congress,  will  confront  the  con-
tradiction inherent in extending extraterritorial regula-
tion while defending domestic producers from foreign
regulation.
Anecdotal evidence is consistent with these conjec-
tures. Initiatives to expand extraterritorial regulation
tend to come from Congress. In trade law, Congress is
a  perennial  source of  protectionist  measures,  which
the Executive tends to resist.
Examples of the tension between Congress and the
Executive  over  protectionism,  albeit  not  precisely  in
the  form  of  extraterritorial  regulation,  include  the
2000 Byrd Amendment, which increased the incentive
of  domestic  producers  to  seek  antidumping  and
countervailing duties on imports and which the Clinton
Administration  unsuccessfully  battled,  and  the  2007
broadening  of  Exon-Florio  regulation  of  inbound  in-
vestment  following  the  Dubai  Ports  World  kerfuffle,
which the Bush II Administration unsuccessfully res-
isted  [15].  Both  these  measures  restricted  imports
(goods in the case of the Byrd Amendment, capital in
the case of the Dubai Ports World legislation) in ways
that invite retaliation and probably reduce overall U.S.
welfare. The laundry list of protectionist legislation that
never gets out of Congress, often because of Executive
opposition, is extensive and well known. A more sys-
tematic review of the evidence, I suspect, would pro-
duce  conclusions  broadly  consistent  with  the  simple
model, but I do not pretend to have conducted that study.
Finally, courts have complex incentives. One might
postulate two general forces shaping their preferences.
First, one would expect some correlation between their
policy preferences and those of the President who se-
lected them. Second, judges react to litigation and the
way it frames choices as much, if not more, as they
proactively seek to shape legal policy. One, thus, would
anticipate some influence over their choices by litig-
ants that appear before them.
It  seems  plausible  that  the  effect  of  Presidential
preferences on judicial behavior might increase as one
moves up the  judicial  hierarchy.  While  personnel  in
the Executive might investigate the careers of judicial
candidates  to  predict  future  voting  behavior,  they
would know that such research is costly relative to the
value of the data derived. It is notoriously difficult to
predict the future voting patterns of judges, especially
with respect to issues that may become important but
have  not  yet  arisen  (the  known  unknowns).  The
willingness of the Executive to incur these costs likely
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increases with the importance of the position. Accord-
ingly, the odds that a judge will vote consistently with
the  preferences  of  the  nominating  President  may
increase as one goes up the hierarchy, with Supreme
Court nominees subject to the greatest investment in
selection [16].
Conversely, one would expect the effect of litigant
framing to be greatest in the lower courts. First, fed-
eral district  courts and courts of appeals, unlike the
Supreme Court,  have  no  control  over  their  docket.
Second, lower federal judges tend to have strong local
ties,  including  repeat  interactions  with  the  lawyers
who bring suits. Third, relative to the Supreme Court,
lower federal judges have fewer resources to conduct
independent research into the matters before them,
and thus rely more heavily on the representations of
the  lawyers  in  particular  cases.  Lower  court  judges
both see more cases and have fewer staff. In particu-
lar,  their  law clerks  come out  of  a  less  competitive
process and generally have no prior legal experience,
while Supreme Court clerks attain their position after
great competition and typically have a year or more of
legal work before they come to their posts.
These conjectures about influences on judicial de-
cisionmaking support several  hypotheses.  First,  they
imply that litigant choices will have a greater influence
on the lower courts. Executive branch screening will
be weakest at the lower levels of the judiciary, and
judges  will  have  more  extensive  contacts  with  the
local  bar.  Accordingly,  ceteris  paribus,  lower  courts,
compared to the Supreme Court, are more likely to
produce  outcomes that  litigating  lawyers  favor.  The
Supreme Court,  with greater control  over its  docket
and,  by tradition,  always sitting en banc,  might act
more on the basis of the median policy preferences of
the Justices. Under the normal structure of litigation,
the lower courts get the first opportunity to address
open legal questions, with the Supreme Court choos-
ing the moment when to intervene and bless or cor-
rect  the  path taken.  Accordingly,  one might  predict
gradual expansion of regulatory jurisdiction, including
extraterritorial  extensions,  through  lower  court  de-
cisions, with episodic resistance by the Supreme Court.
In  different  government  structures,  of  course,
different  dynamics  can  result.  The  European  Com-
munity, for example, lacks a popularly elected execut-
ive, the function of its Parliament is more complicated,
and its mechanism for judicial selection and choice of
judicial structure is completely different from that of
the United States. Accordingly, much of this informal
model is inapplicable. Thus my conjectures are limited
to the United States, although specialists in comparat-
ive government might find ways of revising and ex-
tending them to other systems (cf. [17]).
3. The Morrison Case
The  conjectures,  if  nothing  else,  resonate  with  the
particular story of securities-law extraterritoriality. The
statutory provision at issue, Section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, authorizes the Securit-
ies and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue regula-
tions defining sanctionable misbehavior in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security [18]. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and its district
courts  play  an  outsized  role  in  securities  litigation,
largely due to the presence of the country's leading
financial center in their jurisdiction. The history of se-
curities litigation hence is largely a story of the rela-
tionship between the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court.
In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which
broadly prohibits fraudulent or deceptive practices in
connection  with  the  purchase  or  sale  of  a  security
[19]. In 1946 a federal district court ruled that victims
of 10b-5 violations may bring suit in their own right
for compensation, and later lower court decisions co-
alesced  around  this  result  [20].  Class  actions  suits
based on Rule 10b-5 took off in the mid-1960s, and in
1968 the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook
[21]  ruled  that  actions in  Canada that  affected the
market price of securities sold in the United States fell
within 10b-5's scope. Judge Lumbard, the author of
that decision, had worked in securities regulation be-
fore joining the bench and, his opinions indicate, gen-
erally preferred expanding the scope of that regime.
Three Second Circuit decisions in the early 1970s, all
written  by  Judge  Friendly,  both  more  famous  and
more conservative than Lumbard, moderated Schoen-
baum by limiting regulatory scope to instances where
foreign actions had a direct  effect  on a U.S.  victim
(and not simply an effect on the market) or a per-
petuation of fraud affecting a foreign transaction in-
volved substantial conduct on U.S. territory [22-24].
So  the  law  stood,  with  insignificant  variations  in
other Circuits, until Morrison. That case involved Aus-
tralian investors in an Australian company that sought
compensation  for  injuries  resulting  from  the  com-
pany's  misleading statements  about  certain  transac-
tions  undertaken  in  the  United  States.  The  Second
Circuit,  applying its case law, ruled that the alleged
misconduct fell outside the scope of U.S. jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, while affirming the result, effect-
ively spanked the Second Circuit for its legal analysis.
It held that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 applied only
to sales transactions that take place on U.S. territory
or (less clearly) involving securities registered in the
United  States  under  the  Securities  and  Securities
Exchange Acts [25].
The Second Circuit  approach generally  benefitted
lawyers by employing vague standards to determine
the extraterritorial scope of U.S. regulation. The open-
ended effects and conducts tests increase the need
for  legal  services  at  both  the planning  and  dispute
resolution stages. Moreover, while the rule might have
been suboptimal for some clients of the defense bar,
its effects on them were mixed. While vague extrater-
ritoriality produced a heightened regulatory burden on
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U.S. financial institutions involved in foreign transac-
tions, it imposed at least as large costs on some of
their  foreign  competitors.  There  is  every  reason  to
believe,  in  short,  that  lawyers  in  general  liked  the
Second Circuit approach, because it benefitted them
directly and substantially and had only mixed effects
on their clients. The Supreme Court's intervention in
turn can be interpreted as policy-driven and consistent
with other efforts of that Court to constrain litigation-
friendly behavior by lower courts [26].
4. Alien Tort Litigation
The alien tort litigation saga also resonates with my
informal model. These cases first appeared in 1980,
although the so called Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the
measure on which they rest, is much older [27]. The
earliest suits attacked foreign government officials and
others who wielded state power to commit atrocities
against a local population. Beginning in the late 1990s,
however,  plaintiffs  began  going  after  multinational
corporations, not all based in the United States, that
operate in areas where civil conflict has unfolded or
brutal and oppressive regimes otherwise have terror-
ized the local population. The cases rest on the theory
that a U.S. court would provide a remedy for any viol-
ation of international law that constituted a tort and
injured an alien [28].
As  with  securities  fraud  litigation,  the  ATS  suits
gained support from sympathetic lower federal courts,
punctuated by occasional Supreme Court resistance.
In  2004 the  Supreme Court  in  Sosa  v.  Alvarez-Ma-
chain admonished the lower courts to limit the range
of international law obligations to which this statute
could apply, but the scale, if not the scope, of suits in
the lower courts continued to grow [29]. The Court
returned to the fray in  Kiobel. A majority maintained
that the presumption against extraterritoriality as ex-
pounded in  Morrison  applied to alien tort  suits.  Be-
cause the case involved Nigerian victims of atrocities
that took place in Nigeria and were said to have been
procured by an Anglo-Dutch company, the ATS could
not provide a remedy. In general, the Court declared,
foreign events can give rise  to an ATS suit  in  U.S.
courts only when a claim touches and concerns the
territory of the United States "with sufficient force to
displace the presumption  against  extraterritorial  ap-
plication" [30].
The Kiobel dissenters did not believe that the pre-
sumption has anything to do with a statute that en-
forces international  legal  norms.  Rather,  they would
authorize a tort suit wherever the case involved either
a U.S. defendant or "an important American national
interest" [31]. Foremost in the latter category would
be  instances  where  a  person  sought  refuge  in  the
United  States  after  committing  a  grave  violation  of
international  human rights law.  Even these justices,
however,  rejected  that  idea  that  victims  of  human
rights violations anywhere in the world generally could
seek justice through an ATS suit.
The alien tort regime that Kiobel circumscribed, like
the securities regulation regime cut back in Morrison,
was great for plaintiffs' attorneys, had mixed effects
on defense counsel, and clearly was adverse to the
interests of foreign corporations. From the late 1990s
on,  plaintiffs'  attorneys  saw alien  tort  suits  against
wealthy defendants as a new growth opportunity in
the wake of  other cutbacks on tort  litigation in the
United States. Counsel who represented U.S. corpor-
ate defendants welcomed the work but also respected
their clients' preference not to be sued. Were suits to
proceed,  however,  these  clients  did  want  maximum
exposure for  their  foreign competitors.  Only  foreign
defendants, both wealthy individuals and businesses,
had an unmitigated desire to bar these suits. As with
Morrison, then, the lower courts' relatively permissive
approach  to  alien  tort  litigation  coincided  with  the
general  preferences  of  the  litigating  bar,  while  the
Supreme  Court's  Kiobel decision  reflects  the  policy
preferences of the Court's majority.
5. The Political Economy of the Choice of 
Mechanisms to Determine Extraterritoriality
In the prior section I focused on the incentives facing
Congress, the Executive and the judiciary in deciding
whether to extend regulation extraterritorially. One can
use these factors to analyze potential mechanisms for
choosing extraterritorially. By mechanism, I mean the
rules constraining the process that determines whether
a particular regulatory regime will have any extrater-
ritorial  effect.  To  simplify,  I  describe  three  types  of
mechanisms—a clear statement of extraterritoriality by
Congress, a clear statement by the Executive based
on a delegation of authority by Congress, and exten-
sion  by  private  litigation.  The choice  of  mechanism
involves both different political economies and, I will
argue, significantly different welfare effects.
Given the political economy of extraterritoriality dis-
cussed in the prior section, one would expect to ob-
serve  significant  extraterritorial  regulation  expressly
adopted by Congress. Congress will  exert  maximum
effort to benefit domestic producers, and the Execut-
ive will resist such protection only intermittently. Even
under  a  clear  statement  regime,  one  would  expect
many instances of an extraterritorial regulatory regime.
Casual  empiricism  confirms  this  conjecture.  U.S.
legislation  has  more  express  extraterritoriality  than
one usually encounters in national laws. U.S. tax law,
for example, contains more outbound taxation—taxes
on overseas capital and transactions—than one sees
in  most  rich  countries.  First,  as  to  individuals,  the
United States is almost alone in taxing the worldwide
income of all its citizens, not just its residents [32].
Second,  as  to  corporations,  Subpart  F  contains  ag-
gressive rules for imputing the income of foreign sub-
sidiaries to U.S. parents [33]. As best I can tell, other
countries  do  not  have  as  strong  a  regime  for  re-
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sourcing income of a foreign corporation as domestic
income. This example is significant because taxation
arguably  is  the  most  pervasive  and salient  form of
national  regulation.  Taxation of overseas transaction
in effect punishes firms that employ offshore produc-
tion, and thus conforms to the interest of domestic
producers.
Taxation aside, Congress has had no difficulty ad-
opting  laws  that  expressly  extend  U.S.  regulation
overseas. One is tempted to infer that Congress still
believes that the United States enjoys the same eco-
nomic hegemony it wielded back in 1945. Numerous
examples exist. Although the effects doctrine in anti-
trust was developed judicially, Congress codified this
development in 1982 [34]. The Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act regulates the bribery of only foreign persons,
albeit  with  other  jurisdictional  requirements  [35].
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.  contains a lengthy
list of other statutes with express extraterritorial effect
[36]. Congress responded to the last case almost im-
mediately with an express, if limited, extension of ex-
traterritorial regulation [37].
The puzzle, if there is one, is why Congress does
not do this more often. The answer, it appears, is res-
istance  from the  Executive,  which  channels  foreign
governmental pressure as well the concerns of U.S.-
based  multinational  firms.  The  Byrd  Amendment  of
2000 illustrates the dynamic: A locally interested Sen-
ator  exploited  the  Senate's  procedures  to  insert  a
provision in a bill  that the President could not veto.
The President obtained repeal  several  years  later in
the wake of international retaliation [38]. The consist-
ent opposition of the Bush II and Obama Administra-
tions to congressional efforts to impose sanctions on
China for its currency policies offers another example.
The Executive's  resistance has delayed these meas-
ures for years.
What one sees less frequently is delegation by Con-
gress to an agency of the Executive of discretion to
extend  regulation  extraterritorially.  In  trade  law,  a
possible example is Title III of the Trade Act of 1974,
which gives the Executive authority to sanction states
for overseas conduct that affects the interests of U.S.
exporters  [39].  Even  this  example  is  complicated,
however,  as  Congress  in  1988 sought  to  make this
tool nondiscretionary in specified instances. Informal
rather than formal sanctions attached to the Execut-
ive's refusal to exercise this authority, and in practice
no confrontations between the branches occurred. In
1994 Congress modified Title III by nesting it within
the Executive's authority to seek WTO dispute resolu-
tion. At least when the malefactor belongs to the WTO
(as does almost every significant exporter, including
now even Russia), the Executive thereby acquired sig-
nificant control over the sanctioning process.
A different instance of a delegation involves Section
929P(b)  of  the  Dodd-Frank  Wall  Street  Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. Congress apparently inten-
ded to modify the holding of  Morrison  by giving the
SEC and the Department of Justice,  but not private
plaintiffs, the authority to sanction extraterritorial viol-
ations of Rule 10b-5 [40]. In effect the statute leaves
it to the exclusive discretion of the Executive to de-
termine when the Securities Exchange Act might apply
extraterritorially and limits sanctions to those that the
Executive can seek [41].
At  first  glance the relative paucity of  delegations
seems surprising. Congress has at least one clear in-
centive to delegate regulatory authority to the Execut-
ive:  After  delegation,  influential  Members  then  can
lobby  the  agencies  on  behalf  of  interested  persons
(see [42]). Perhaps the reason for the paucity is that
extraterritoriality is different. Congress might believe
that the Executive is especially susceptible to foreign
pressure  and  therefore  an  untrustworthy  delegate
with respect to this issue. Even clear legislative state-
ments of extraterritoriality run up against the Execut-
ive's prosecutorial discretion, as illustrated by the cur-
rent version of Title III of the Trade Act of 1974. Con-
gress might believe that expressly endorsing the Exec-
utive's power not to act serves no useful purpose.
The third mechanism for choosing to regulate ex-
traterritorially is to leave the question to the courts.
This approach requires legislation that does not advert
clearly to the issue and judicial willingness to fill the
statutory gap with a rule that permits at least some
extraterritorial application. The now repudiated secur-
ities law decisions in the Second Circuit and the host
of lower-court ATS cases illustrate this approach, as
does the pre-1982 judicial interpretation of the Sher-
man Act. Other instances where the lower courts cur-
rently assume responsibility for determining extrater-
ritoriality in the absence of clear approval  from the
Supreme Court include civil RICO (see [43-46].
The  previous  section  sketches  out  some reasons
why lawyers would prefer this approach but persons
at risk of regulation might not. Delegations to the ju-
diciary to determine extraterritoriality result in case-
by-case  lawmaking.  Vague  standards,  the  inevitable
product of judicial  management of competing policy
claims, invite litigation, which lawyers like and clients
do not. In some industries, the cost of the legal risk
might be offset by the prospect that foreign competit-
ors  will  face  the  same,  and  perhaps  even  greater,
costs once regulation is exported. Within the judiciary,
resistance to this mechanism comes mostly from the
Supreme Court, where Justices have greater freedom
to pursue their policy preferences and are less host-
age to the agenda-setting of litigants than are lower
court judges.
One suspects that, even if extraterritorial regulation
has net benefits  for some domestic  producers,  they
would prefer the decision to come through the legis-
lative  process  (see  [47]).  Extraterritorial  extension
achieved through case-by-case decisionmaking entails
considerable uncertainty. The extension is never abso-
lute, but subject to a fact-specific test such as the dir-
ect-effects standard. The standard increases risk along
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several  dimensions.  A  domestic  producer  cannot  be
confident when it can escape regulation or when its
competitors will be sanctioned. Moreover, as long as
any one regulatory statute generates judicial extrater-
ritorial  extension,  there  remains a threat  that  other
statutes might generate similar outcomes. The uncer-
tainty about application thus extends across a range
of statutory regimes.
Another factor in the mix is the Executive. On the
one  hand,  at  least  some  administrations  internalize
the interests of litigators, at least to some extent. The
Obama Administration,  through an amicus brief,  de-
fended the approach of the Second Circuit under the
Securities Exchange Act [48]. It  also persuaded the
Solicitor  General  in  its  Kiobel  amicus  brief  to  back
away from its earlier strong opposition to extraterrit-
oriality [49]. On the other hand, the Executive some-
times  prefers  to  have  a  monopoly  over  regulation
rather than competing with private attorney generals.
Private competition undermines the ability of the Ex-
ecutive to bargain for cooperation through plea bar-
gains,  because then the Executive cannot immunize
defendants  from  civil  liability  sought  directly  by
victims. This dynamic exists in all regulatory schemes,
but  the  stakes  go  up  when  extraterritoriality  is  in-
volved. Where foreign application exists, private liabil-
ity disrupts the bargains not only of domestic regulat-
ors, but of foreign regulatory authorities as well. This
disruption in turn impedes international regulatory co-
operation in  other areas,  such as  sharing  of  intelli-
gence. The Bush II Administration relied on this argu-
ment in  F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v.  Empagran S.A.,
where  is  successfully  persuaded  the  Court  to  limit
standing under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act so as to limit private competition with pub-
lic extraterritorial enforcement [50].
The  relative  skepticism  of  the  Executive  toward
judicial  management of  the  extraterritorial  scope  of
regulation also might explain why the Supreme Court
pushes back against legislation that invites but does
not  command  extraterritorial  application.  As  noted
above, the Executive invests more in the selection of
Supreme Court  justices,  who in  turn  are  less  influ-
enced by the preferences of the litigating bar than are
lower  court  judges.  It  is  plausible  that  skepticism
about Congressional efforts to smuggle extraterritorial
application into ambiguous legislation might be one of
the characteristics for which the Executive looks in its
Supreme Court nominees.
6. Welfare Effects of Extraterritorial Regulation 
through Litigation
Finally,  although  this  essay  is  anchored  in  positive
political economy analysis, a brief note about the wel-
fare effects of extraterritorial regulation, in particular
regulation  through  litigation,  is  warranted.  Political
economy  has  its  greatest  salience  when  identifying
public  decisionmaking  that  reduces  overall  welfare.
There exist substantial reasons to believe that extra-
territorial  regulation  effected  through  the  litigation
process does exactly this.
Regulation  through  litigation  comprises  two  ele-
ments—prescriptive jurisdiction and adjudicative juris-
diction.  Prescriptive  jurisdiction  involves  the  sover-
eign's decision to apply its rules to an offshore trans-
action.  Adjudicative  jurisdiction  involves  the  court's
ability to hear a case against a particular party, includ-
ing  nonresidents.  Expansive  prescriptive  rules  mean
applying a local,  presumably more stringent, rule to
offshore conduct. Expansive adjudicative rules mean
submitting offshore actors to U.S. litigation, whatever
the substantive rule might be.
Alan Sykes has analyzed the welfare costs of litiga-
tion-based regulation. He observed that the extension
of  regulation  through  litigation  does  not  result  in
universal application of the regime. Rather, the rules
apply  only  to  firms that  engage in  activities  in  the
United States or own assets located there. Subjecting
a subset of producers to a regulatory regime not im-
posed on others results is the functional equivalent of a
trade  barrier,  which  has  well  documented  costs  in
terms of distorting production and sales decisions [51].
Sykes's argument focuses on prescriptive jurisdic-
tion, but it can be extended to adjudicative jurisdic-
tion. To the extent that defending in a U.S. courtroom
is more costly than in a foreign court (due to unique
practices such as civil jury trials, class action proced-
ures,  contingency  fees  arrangements  for  plaintiffs'
attorneys,  broad  pretrial  discovery,  and  access  to
punitive damages), broad adjudicative jurisdiction im-
poses costs on firms that enter the U.S. market. In
deciding whether to compete in the U.S. market, for-
eign firms must take account of a set of procedural
rules  that  function  as  a  tax  on  doing  business.
Moreover, the tax is unique, because other civil litiga-
tion systems do not use these devices, or do so to a
lesser extent.
Particular  welfare  arguments  apply  to  delegating
the decision whether to regulate extraterritorially to
courts. Instability of domain rules—the determination
of the scope of conduct to which a set of rules applies
—has unambiguously negative effects (see cases cited
in [47]). One can defend vagueness in standards that
regulate primary conduct by arguing that postponing
definition of legal requirements until application allows
the regulator to exploit information that was hidden at
the  time  of  the  standard's  promulgation.  No  such
argument applies to domain rules. Uncertainty about
the applicable legal regime, as opposed to the particu-
lar rule governing primary conduct, only encourages
opportunism by persons who, after the fact, find ap-
plication of a particular regime beneficial.
The  litigation  mechanism  by  its  nature  produces
vagueness and uncertainty about one particular do-
main question, namely the applicability of a regulatory
regime to foreign conduct. As a normative matter, it
has clear costs and dubious benefits. It thus appears
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that the persistence of this mechanism represents a
classic  public  choice  story,  in  which  a  homogenous
and  concentrated  interest  group  (litigators)  obtain
rents but produce a net loss in social welfare.
7. Conclusion
In a world where changes in information and trans-
portation  technologies  encourage  the  growth  of
transborder  transactions,  the question of  extraterrit-
orial regulation takes on greater salience. The issue
has two dimensions: the policy question of whether to
apply  a  regulatory  regime extraterritorially,  and the
structural question of how to assign the authority to
resolve the policy question. Political economy analysis
can shed light on both of these dimensions.
This  paper  extends  traditional  political  economy
accounts  of  U.S.  lawmaking  by  focusing  on  the
distinct  incentives  surrounding  Supreme  Court  and
lower court  decisionmaking. This  extension provides
an explanation for the Court's most recent high profile
decisions in this area. It also points toward a normat-
ive  assessment.  It  indicates  that  the  tendency  of
Congress to tolerate, and of lower courts to embrace,
judicial management of the decision whether to apply
regulation extraterritorially almost certainly has signi-
ficant  welfare  costs.  The  recent  efforts  of  the  Su-
preme Court to resist this tendency may reflect not
only the particular political economy of the selection
of justices, but also constrain those costs.
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